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ABSTRACT In recent years, Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has become increasingly important for
applications in the industry. Inevitably, security for IIoT has become a priority in order to deploy secure appli-
cations. Amongst available cryptographic tools, certificateless signature schemes offer sound authentication
solutions and avoid public-key certification from Trusted Third Parties (TTP). Certificateless signatures
solve the key escrow problem against the dishonest Private Key Generator (PKG) and has considered to
be a useful tool for IIoT applications. Recently, Karati et al. (IEEE Trans. Industrial Informatics, vol.14,
no. 8, 2018) presented a lightweight certificateless signature scheme for IIoT Environments. This scheme
was then broken by Zhang et al. (IEEE Access, vol. 8, 2018) by simply allowing to change the public key
of the signer and using the homomorphic property of the original scheme. In this paper, we introduce a
new attack to the scheme against the existential unforgeability, which is universal since we do not have
to assume homomorphic property. We then introduce an entirely new lightweight certificateless signature
scheme, which has been proven to be fully secure against all attacks found earlier. Our scheme is the first
lightweight certificateless signature scheme with full security and is the most efficient in comparison with
other existing schemes. It is desirable for IIoT applications. We also provide experimental results to justify
our claims.
INDEX TERMS IIoT authentication, certificateless signature, provable security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of IoT across various industrial sectors is
called Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) which enables
automation using cloud computing, such as manufactur-
ing, transportation, energy management, smart healthcare,
etc. [1]. Compared with the traditional industrial monitoring
systems, IIoT increases flexibility and intelligent processes
that lower down costs of development and maintenance.
While emerging IIoT offers new opportunities, it poses new
security threats related to unauthorised data access.
In IIoT, an enormous amount of data collected from
different sources is needed to be processed and analysed.
Cloud servers are used to ease data exchange and compu-
tation between sensors, smart devices and users due to the
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Yinghui Zhang .
constrained feature of IIoT devices. For example, cloud-
assisted IIoT is one of the applications for providing health
monitoring [2]. However, cloud data access arises new chal-
lenges because data can be accessed, modified or deleted
by unauthorised users. Hereby, many authentication proto-
cols and digital signature schemes have been proposed in
the literature to ensure data authenticity In addition, energy
consumption is an important criteria in designing security
protocols for IIoT devices because such security implementa-
tions require expensive cryptographic operations. Therefore,
it is important to design lightweight and secure cryptographic
schemes to reduce energy consumption.
In traditional signature schemes, the binding between a
user and his public key is provided by a certificate issued
by a trusted third party (TTP) (or certification author-
ity (CA)). To simplify the certificate management process,
in 1984, Shamir [3] introduced the notion of identity-based
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cryptography (IBC) where the user’s public key is his identity
(such as email address, name, etc.) as some unique informa-
tion. The first practical identity-based encryption (IBE) was
proposed by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [4]. In their scheme,
the TTP or key generation center (KGC) is completely trusted
and holds the user’s private key which can then generate the
secret keys of all its users. It is also a concern that the private
keys of users must be distributed over secure channels [5].
Then, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography
(CL-PKC) was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [6] in
Asiacrypt 2003 to avoid the key-escrow of IBC.
In CL-PKC, certificates are no longer needed for ensur-
ing the authenticity of public keys and therefore the key
escrow problem in IBC is alleviated. However, similar to IBC,
CL-PKC relies on the existence of a KGC who holds the
‘‘master-key’’. To elaborate, KGC does not hold private key
of the users, yet it can produce partial private key Di. The
partial private key is constructed from the user’s identity IDi,
and then is transferred to the user i via a secure channel.
Consequently, the user i computes his real private key by
combining his partial private keyDi, some secret information,
and the KGC’s public parameters to generate his private
signing key and the corresponding public verification key.
There are two types of attacks against CL-PKC:
Type-I - Key Replacement Attack [7] replaces the user’s
public key with a chosen value, without having access to Di.
The second type of attack (Type-II -Malicious KGC) refers to
a KGC who knows Di and impersonates the user, but it does
not know the user’s secret key or cannot replace the public
key [7], [8].
In a recent work, Karati et al. [9] introduced a certificate-
less signature (CLS) scheme for IIoT environments. Unfortu-
nately, it has been broken by Zhang et al. [10] showing that it
cannot resist both Type-I and Type-II attacks. Because of the
homomorphic property of the CLS scheme of Karati et al.,
Zhang et al. also showed that it is not existentially unforge-
able. In fact, with two valid signatures obtained from signa-
ture queries, one can obtain a new signature on a message
of m = mimj, where mi and mj are associated with two
different signatures obtained by the adversary butmmight not
be meaningful to the verifier. They called it ‘‘known message
attack’’. Zhang et al. also showed that the security proofs of
the work proposed by Karati et al. are incorrect.
In this paper, we show that the known message attack can
be easily repaired by hashing the message. However, we also
found a universal attack against Karati et al.’s signature, even
if the known message attack by Zhang et al. has been fixed.
Our attack shows that any one who has a valid signature from
signature queries can forge a new signature on an arbitrary
message; therefore, we call it ‘‘universal attack’’. We present
an entirely new lightweight CL signature scheme which is
secure against all identified attacks and provide completely
security proofs.We also carried out an experiment to simulate
our scheme and other related schemes and show that our
scheme is the most efficient.
II. RELATED WORK
Al-Riami and Paterson [6] introduced the notion of cer-
tificateless signature (CLS) and encryption (CLE) in 2005.
We refer them as certificateless cryptography (CL-PKC).
Since then, several CLS schemes were proposed to improve
the original scheme and security models. In [11], a generic
construction of CLS was presented. Kang et al. [12] pro-
posed a CLS scheme based on bilinear pairings and proved
its security in the random oracle model assuming that the
underlying group is Gap Diffie-Hellman group, to which the
security proof is reduced. They borrowed the idea of ID-based
signature and BLS signature and created a delegation-by-
certificate proxy signature scheme which enables delegation
of singing rights. These early works did not consider key
replacement attacks.
To improve the CL-PKC scheme, Al-Riyami proposed
a new CL-PKC scheme [13]. They provide a generic
conversion to obtain a CBE scheme from any secure
CL-PKC scheme which improves the original Gentry’s CBE
scheme [14]. Based on this work, Huang et al. [7] showed that
the proposed Al-Riami’s CL-PKC is insecure in their security
model. The reason is that, an attacker without possessing the
master key can launch a public key replacement attack. In the
same paper, Huang et al. [7] provided a new CLS scheme
to repair the problem. Later, Au et al. [8] presented new
CLS security models which assume that the KGC is passive
and cannot actively replace the user public key or corrupt
the user secret key. They therefore allow a malicious KGC
with some conditions. Huang et al. [15] revisited security
models of the CLS scheme and proposed new constructions
in the random oracle model. The paper introduced three kinds
of adversaries, namely Normal Adversary, Strong Adver-
sary, and Super Adversary. However, the proposed scheme
by Huang et al. is proved to be universally forgeable by
Type-I adversary who can replace users’ public keys and
generate new signatures under the replaced public keys [16].
To enhance the proposed CLS schemes in real applica-
tions (e.g. IoT), several works proposed short CLS schemes
(e.g., [17]–[19]). The idea of the short CLS schemes is to use
signature schemes in low-bandwidth communication devices.
Recently, Karati et al. [9] proposed a lightweight cer-
tificateless signature scheme for IIoT environments. Unfor-
tunately, it has been broken by Zhang et al. [10], who
showed it is insecure against Type-I attacks and Type-II
attacks. Zhang et al. [10] also showed that security proofs
in Karati et al. [9] are incorrect. Based on these work we
provide a comprehensive analysis and solution to the CLS
scheme, which has a special significance to the research and
application in IIoT.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a general IIoT scenario that consists of a key
generation center (KGC), a cloud sever which provides stor-
age service for IIoT users, a data owner and a data user
who is usually not a data owner, magenta and IIoT sensors.
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FIGURE 1. IIoT system model.
The systemmodel of our improved IIoT CLS scheme consists
of the following four entities;
• Private Key Generator (KGC): generates system public
parameters and partial-private-keys for cloud server and
users (data owner and data user).
• Cloud Server: responsible for processing data from
data owners. It then communicates with users for data
exchange and computation.
• Data Owner: creates certificateless signature (CLS)
scheme of his data with his private signing key which
is generated with the partial private key received from
KGC. The corresponding public key is sent to data user
for signature verification. The CLS data is stored on
the cloud server and therefore data user retrieves for the
verification.
• Data User: receives his partial-private-key from KGC
and data owner’s public key to verify the CLS scheme.
With the partial private key, he can generate his own
private signing key and its corresponding public key.
For authentication, he can also sign his communication
flows for communication with the cloud.
As shown in Figure 1, in the proposed IIoT system, users
are initially needed to be registered with KGC who is con-
sidered as a network administrator. The KGC generates and
publishes public parameters and partial private keys. Users
send their identities for registration to KGC and receive their
partial private keys. Then, data owners and data users create
their private signing keys and use them for generating CLS
of IIoT data. The user’s keys are stored on their smart IIoT
devices. The IIoT data from IIoT sensors are stored in the
cloud server and then collected by the data owner, signed and
stored as CLS data. Finally, the stored IIoT data on the cloud
can be retrieved by data users and verified with the given data
owner’s public key.
In the rest of presentation, we revisit and analyse the secu-
rity of Karati et al.’s scheme and its security issues. Then,
we propose an entirely new CLS which offers full security
against all identified attacks and present a complete security
proof using the standard security model (without random
oracles). Because of its lightweightness and security, it can
be adopted in our proposed IIoT scenario.
IV. DEFINITIONS
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G and GT be cyclic group pairs of prime order p and e :
G × G → GT be a bilinear mapping with the following
properties:
• Bilinearity: e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for all g ∈ G and
a, b ∈R Z∗p.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1GT .
• Computability: The map e can be computed efficiently.
B. Q-BSDH ASSUMPTION
Let G be an ordered cyclic group of prime order p with
generator g. The q-BSDH is stated as follows:
Given as input a (q+ 1)-tuple
〈g, gx , gx
2








∈ Zp ×G for c ∈R Zp\{−x}.
A solves the q-BSDH problem in G with advantage ε, if
Advq-BSDHA :=Pr
[
A(g, gx , gx
2









where the probability is over the random choice of generators
g ∈R G, the random choice of x ∈R Zp, and the random bits
consumed by A.
Definition 1 (q-BSDH Assumption): The (q, t, ε)-BSDH
assumption holds in G, if no t-time algorithm has advantage
at least ε in solving the q-BSDH problem in G.
C. FORMAL DEFINITION OF CLS
The formal structure of a CLS scheme consists of the follow-
ing seven algorithms;
1) (msk,params) ← Setup(λ). Given as input security
parameter λ, the algorithm outputs the master key msk
and the system public parameters params.
2) Di ← Set-Partial-Private-Key(msk, IDi). Given as
input master key msk and user’s identity IDi, the algo-
rithm outputs partial private key Di.
3) xi ← Set-Secret-Value(params, IDi). Given as
input a parameter list params, partial private key Di,
the algorithm outputs secret value xi.
4) SKi ← Set-Secret-Key(params, xi,Di). Given as
input public parameters params, the user’s partial pri-
vate key Di and the user’s secret value xi, the algorithm
outputs a private signing key SKi.
5) Yi ← Set-Public-Key(xi, IDi). Given as input secret
value xi and the user’s identity IDi, the algorithm out-
puts the user’s public key Yi.
6) σ ← CLS-Sign(SKi,m). Given as input signer’s
secret key SKi and message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, the algorithm
outputs CLS signature σ .
7) True/False ← CLS-Verify(params, IDi,Yi,m, σ ).
Given as input the public parameters params,
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the signer’s identity IDi, the signer’s public key Yi,
messagem, and signature σ , the algorithm outputs True
if the signature σ is valid. Otherwise, it outputs False.
D. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
Type-I: This type of adversary is referred to an adversary AI
who does not have access to the master-key, but it has the
ability to replace the public key of any user with a value
chosen at random.
Type-II: This type of adversary is referred to an adversary
AII who has access to the master-key, but it does not have the
ability to perform public keys replacement.
Definition 2 (Type-I Adversary): A CLS scheme is
(t, qpp, qss, qs, ε) Type-I secure under the adaptive chosen
message and ID attack, if AI gains a negligible advantage
against qpp number of partial private key queries, qss number
of set secret value queries, and qs number of signature queries
in polynomial time t in the below game between an adversary
AI and a challenger C. ε is the advantage of AI to forge a
signature.
• Setup : The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to
obtain system public parameters params andmaster key
msk. Then, C sends params to the adversary AI.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract : AI requests the partial
private key of the user with identity IDi. Then, C outputs
Di as the user’s partial private key.
• Set-Secret-Value : AI receives the secret value xi of
identity IDi from C.
• Set-Secret-Key :AI receives the private keySKi of IDi
from C.
• Set-Public-Key : AI receives the public key Yi of IDi
from C.
• Public-Key-Replacement :AI set Y ′i as the new public
key of the user and submit (xi,Y ′i , IDi) to C.
• SignQueries : AI makes signature queries on message
m ∈M wrt any ID, where m 6= m∗ for ID∗. In response,
C outputs a valid signature σ (m) under the public key
of AI.
• Output : Finally, AI outputs a message and signature
pair m∗, σ ∗ of the user with identity ID∗. The message
and signature pair (σ ∗,m∗) must satisfy the following
conditions:
– AI has not queried Set-Partial-Private-Key and
Sign of the tuple (ID∗,Y ∗,m∗).
– The forged signature σ ∗ is valid under the public
key Y ∗ chosen by AI, where AI may change the
public key.
Definition 3 (Type-II Adversary): A CLS scheme is
(t, qss, qs, ε) Type-II secure under the adaptive chosen mes-
sage and ID attack, if AII gains a negligible advantage
against qss number of set secret value queries, and qs number
of signature queries in polynomial time t in the following
game between an adversary AII and a challenger C. ε is the
advantage of AII to forge a signature.
• Setup : The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm
to obtain public parameters params and the master
key msk. Then C sends params and msk to the
adversary AII.
• As in the definition of Type-I adversary, AII makes
Partial-Private-Key-Extractqueries,Set-Secret-Value
queries, Set-Secret-Key queries, Set-Public-Key
queries, and SignQueries.
• Output : Finally,AII outputs a signature σ ∗ on message
m∗ of the user with identity ID∗. The message and signa-
ture pair (σ ∗,m∗) must satisfy the following conditions:
– AII has not queried Set-Secret-value and Sign of
the tuple (ID∗,Y ∗,m∗).
– The forged signature σ ∗ is valid under the public
key Y ∗ chosen by AII.
V. REVIEW OF KARATI ET AL.’S SCHEME
The proposed CLS scheme in [9] consists of the following six
algorithms:
• params ← Setup(λ). Taking as input security param-
eter λ, KGC outputs system parameters params =
〈G,GT , g1, g2, e, p,Y KGC,H〉, where G = 〈g1〉 is a
group of prime order p generated by g1, and a bilinear
pairing e : G×G→ GT . KGC selects a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p and master secret key msk =
y ∈R Z∗p. KGC sets g2 = e(g1, g1)y and public key
Y KGC = g
y
1. KGC keeps msk = y as private key and
outputs public parameters params.
• (Di, hi, yi)← Set-Partial-Private-Key(params,msk,
IDi). Taking as input public parameters params, master
private key y of KGC, and user’s identity IDi, it computes
hi = H (IDi) and yi = g
y·hi
hi+ri+y
1 where ri ∈R Z
∗
p. Then,
KGC computes the partial private key Di = (yi,Ri)
where Ri = g
ri








yi, (ghi · Ri · Y KGC)
)
.
• SKi ← Set-Secret-Value(IDi). Given public parame-
ters params, user’s identity IDi, the algorithm computes
the secret key SKi = (ci, xi,Ri) where (ci, xi) are chosen
at random.
• Yi← Set-Public-Key(xi, IDi). Given public parameters
params and secret value xi, the algorithm returns the
user public key Yi as follows:










• σ ← CLS-Sign(prams,SKi,m). Given public param-
eters params, secret key SKi, and message m ∈ Z∗p, it
selects t ∈R Z∗p and computes hi, σ1, and σ2 as follows










It outputs signature of message m as σ = (σ1, σ2).
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• Valid/Invalid ← CLS-Verify(params, IDi,Yi,m, σ ).
Given public parameters params, signature σ of mes-
sagem, the user’s identity IDi and public key Yi. Outputs









VI. OUR ATTACK ON KARATI’S CLS SCHEME
The security model in the work due to Al-Riyami and
Paterson [6] captures the existentially unforgeability against
Type-I and Type-II adversaries. Zhang et al. [10] showed that
the scheme of Karati et al. is actually forgeable under the
attacks of Type-I or Type-II adversaries. Their Type-II attack
can be fixed by changing the message m to a hash message.
In this section, we show that the scheme proposed by Karati’s
et al. is insecure even if the attacks in Zhang et al.’s scheme
had been fixed. In our attack, the adversary can always forge
a user’s signature on a message of its choice; therefore it is
universal.
Here, we show only CLS-Sign algorithm. The rest of the
algorithms are same as described in the original scheme in [9].
CLS-Sign: The adversary received a valid signature σ (m)
of IDi in the signature query list from the challenger C where
m ∈ Z∗p. Ignoring the signature challenge from C, to forge
the signature, the adversary AI selects a message m′ ∈R Z∗p
wherem′ 6= m andm′ could be the challengemessagem∗, and
then performs the following to compute the forged signature
of IDi:








where t ′ = t · mm′ ,
• Compute σ2 as
σ ′2 =
(














• Publish σ ′ = (σ ′1, σ
′
2) as the forged signature of
message m′.
The attack is successful as it is easy to find that the verifi-
cation on (σ ′,Yi) returns Valid.
Compared with the knownmessage attack, our attack gives
a valid signature on anymeaningful message, even if the mes-
sage is hashed before signed. Therefore, the fix to the known
message attack cannot be applied to our attack. Actually,
our attack can be easily repaired by simply changing m
to H (σ1,m). However, there are still remaining problems:
(1) the key replacement attacks still stand; (2) the scheme
cannot be proved due to the challenger cannot answer the
signature queries when ID = ID∗ and m 6= m∗; (3) the
reduction in the proofs is based on the public key, which is
entirely wrong. Therefore, their scheme is beyond repairable.
VII. OUR FULLY SECURE LIGHTWEIGHT CLS SCHEME
A. THE SCHEME
params← Setup(λ). Taking as input security parameter λ,
KGC outputs system parameters params = 〈G,GT , g, g1,
e, p,Y KGC,H〉, whereG andGT are multiplicative groups of
prime order p, and a bilinear pairing e : G×G→ GT . KGC
selects a hash functions H : Zp→ Zp and H1 : {0, 1}∗→ G
and the master secret key msk = s ∈R Zp. KGC’s public key
is Y KGC = gs. KGC outputs public parameters params.
di ← Set-Partial-Private-Key(params,msk, IDi). Tak-
ing as input public parameters params, master private key
s of KGC, and user’s identity IDi. It computes di = gsi ,
and Yi1 = gi, where gi = H1(IDi) ∈R G and is unique
for user IDi. di is the private key for user IDi. Accept, if
e(di, g) = e(gi,YKGC) and gi = H1(IDi).
SK ← Set-Secret-Value(IDi). Given public parameters
params, user’s identity IDi, it outputs the secret keySKi = xi
where xi is chosen at random.
Yi ← Set-Public-Key(xi, IDi). Given public parameters
params, secret value xi and identity IDi, it outputs the user
public key Yi as Yi1 = gi,Yi2 = gxi . Check if the equality
holds: e(di, g) = e(gi,YKGC).
σ ← CLS-Sign(params,SKi, di,m). Given public
parameters params, secret key SKi, di and messageM ∈ Zp,








It outputs the signature of message M as σ = (r, S).
Valid/Invalid←CLS-Verify(params, IDi,Yi,m, σ ).Given
public parameters params, signature σ of message M ,





gr · (Yi2)H (r,Yi2,m)
))
.





























Theorem 1: Suppose the (q, t ′, ε)-BSDH assumption
holds in G. If there exists a PPT algorithm AI that can break
(t, qpp, qss, qs, ε)-secure against existential forgery including
key replacement with advantage Adv Type-IAI , then there exists
a PPT algorithm C that can solve the q-BSDH problem with
advantage













t ≤ t ′ −2(qs + q)T ,
VOLUME 7, 2019 144437
F. Rezaeibagha et al.: Fully Secure Lightweight CLS Scheme for IIoT
where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation in
G,GT , and Zp.
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we omit the hash
function H (). Suppose that there is an adversary AI that can
break Type-I security of our proposed CLS scheme. Given
the q-BSDH problem instance T = 〈G, g, gx , gx2 , · · · , gxq〉,
the challenger C uses A′Is queries and responses to compute
the solution (c, e(g, g)
1
x+c ) of the q-BSDH instance for some
known c ∈R Z∗p , c ∈ Zp\{−x} and unknown x ∈R Z∗p where
G is a multiplicative group of order p. We assume ID∗ andm∗
cannot be queried together by AI.
Consider Ai = gx
i
where ∀i ∈ [1, q]. The algorithm C
proceeds the following game with the adversary AI. Assume
ID∗i ,m
∗
j cannot be queried together by AI.
Setup : Challenger C creates a list L = (ID,Y1,Y2, x, d)
that is empty in the beginning. C selects private key s ∈R
Z∗p and computes public key Y KGC = gs. C sends public
parameters params = (G,GT , e, g, p,Y KGC,H ,H1) to AI.
Create-User IDi : C sets hi = H (IDi) and creates user IDi
and add (IDi, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) to the list L, which initially is empty.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract :AI sends qpp partial private
key queries on IDi to C, where IDi 6= ID∗. If IDi is not in the
list, C calls Create-User for new IDi. Otherwise, C returns
di if it is in the list L. If di is not in the list L, C computes
di = gsi , where Yi1 = gi ∈ G is set for IDi only. C adds
(IDi,Yi1, ∗, ∗, di) to the list L. If IDi = ID∗, C aborts.
Set-Secret-Value : AI sends qss queries to C. For IDi 6=
ID∗ if IDi and xi are in the list L, C returns xi. If xi = ∗,
C selects xi ∈R Z∗p as new secret value for IDi and adds
(IDi,Yi1, ∗, xi, di) to the list L. If IDi is not in the list, it calls
Create-User to create the new user IDi and adds xi to the list
L. If IDi = ID∗, C is unable to provide xi and aborts.
Set-Public-Key : A sends qsp queries on a selected IDi to
C. For IDi 6= ID∗ if IDi is in L, C returns Yi = (Yi1,Yi2), where
Yi1 = gi,Yi2 = gxi , and update L = (IDi,Yi1,Yi2, xi, di).
Otherwise, if IDi = ID∗, C returns: Y∗1 = g∗, Y∗2 = gx ,
where gx is given in the q-BSDH instance, and updates the
list L = (IDi, g∗, gx , ∗, di).
Sign-Queries : Adversary AI makes qs signature queries
for (IDi,mj) to C. If IDi 6= ID∗ and xi is in the list L, C selects








where tj = H (rj,Yi2,mj). C outputs the signature σ = (rj, Sij)
and sends it to AI.
If IDi = ID∗ and mj 6= m∗, where xi = ∗, C performs the
following:
Let f be the univariate polynomial defined as




Expand f and write f (X ) =
∑q
i=0 αiX
i, where α0, · · · , αq ∈
Zp are the coefficients of the polynomial f . C picks a random





Let fj be the polynomial




Weexpand fj and rewrite f (X ) =
∑q
i=0 αiX











where C has rewritten x as tj · x. Returns σ = (rj, Sij) as a
valid signature on mj.
We can easily find that σ is a valid signature on message
mj under the public key Y∗1 = g∗,Y∗2 = gx .AI can continue
signature queries before returning the forged signature.
Public-Key-Replacement : AI replaces the public key






Forgery : Finally, AI outputs a forged signature σ ∗ =
(r∗, S∗) for a message m∗ 6∈ {m1, · · · ,mq} where ID∗ 6= IDi
with public key YID∗ or Y
′
ID∗ . If the σ
∗ can be verified with
X ′ID∗ ,AI wins the game and C is unable to solve the q-BSDH
problem. However, it is negligible in our game, as a PPT AI
is not able to construct a forged signature for any replaced





The forgery is successful if CLS-Verify (params,m∗, σ ∗,








































where x ′ = t∗ · x.
C uses the long division to compute f (x)/(x + r∗) and
computes polynomial f (X ) as f (X ) = (X + r∗)γ (X ) + γ ∗




and γ ∗ ∈ Zp is a constant. Then, it computes f (X ) as follows:







and can deduce S∗ from equation (1) as
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where γ ∗ 6= 0. Notice that since f (X ) =
∏q
i=1(X + ri) and
m∗ /∈ {m1, · · · ,mq}, f (X ) cannot be divided by (X + r∗) and
therefore C outputs the solution e(g1, g1)
1




































x+r∗/t∗ = e(g, g)
1
x+c .






where c = m∗/r∗, and
it then breaks the q-BSDH assumption.
In the following, we perform a probability analysis. For a
successful forgery, we consider three events:
01: C does not abort during the simulation.
02: S∗ is a valid forged signature on m∗ for ID∗.
03: The advantage of AI to forge a signature.






















For Forgery, AI outputs a forged signature. If the verifi-
cation outputs Valid, then the game ends; otherwise C aborts.
The probability C does not abort is Pr[02] = 1/p.
Assume the advantage that AI forges a signature success-
fully is Pr[03] ≥ ε. The overall success probability of
breaking q-BSDH assumption is:
Pr[01 ∧ 02 ∧ 03] = Pr[01] · Pr[02] · Pr[03].
The advantage of AI breaking the q-BSDH assumption is:
Advq -BSDHAI (λ) ≥
(
1−







We now compute the time complexity of the game. Let T
be the time cost for computing an exponentiation.
For Partial-Private-Key-Extract, C requires qppT .
For Set-Public-Key, C requires qspT .
For SignQueries, C requires (qs + q)T .
The total time cost is the sum of these time costs:
qppT + qspT + (qs + q)T ≈ 2(qs + q)T .
The overall time for AI to break the q-BSDH assumption is
considered as t ′ ≥ t +2(qs + q)T .
Theorem 2: Suppose the (q, t ′, ε)-BSDH assumption
holds in G. If there exists a PPT algorithm AII that can
break (t, qpp, qss, qs, ε)-secure against existential forgery
with advantage AdvAII , then there exists a PPT algorithm
C that can solve the q-BSDH problem with advantage













t ≤ t ′ −2(qs + q)T ,
where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation in
G,GT , and Zp.
Proof. Suppose that there is an adversary AII that can break
Type-II security of our proposed CLS scheme. Given the
q-BSDH problem instance T = 〈G, g, gx , gx2 , · · · , gxq〉,
the challenger C uses AII queries and responses to compute
the solution (c, e(g, g)
1
x+c ) of the q-BSDH instance for some
known c ∈R Z∗p, c ∈ Zp\{−x} and unknown x ∈R Z∗p where
G is a multiplicative group of order p. We assume ID∗ andm∗
cannot be queried together by AII.
Consider Ai = gx
i
where ∀i ∈ [1, q]. The algorithm C
proceeds the following game with the adversaryAII. Assume
ID∗i and m
∗
j cannot be queried together by AII.
Setup : Challenger C creates a list
L = (ID,Y1,Y2, x, d, h)
that is empty in the beginning. C selects private key s ∈R Z∗p
and computes public key Y KGC = gs.
C sends public parameters
params = (G,GT , e, g, p,Y KGC,H )
to AII.
Create-User IDi : C sets hi = H (IDi) and creates user
IDi and add (IDi, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, hi) to the list L, which initially is
empty.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract : AII sends qpp partial pri-
vate key queries on IDi to C, where IDi 6= ID∗ or IDi = ID∗.
If IDi is not in the list, C calls Create-User for new IDi. C
computes di = gsi ,where Yi1 = gi ∈ G is set for IDi only, and
adds (IDi,Yi1, ∗, ∗, di, hi) to the list L. Otherwise, C returns
di if it is in the list L. If IDi = ID∗, C aborts.
Set-Secret-Value : AII sends qss queries to C. For IDi 6=
ID∗ if IDi and xi are in the list L, C returns xi. If xi = ∗,
C selects xi ∈R Z∗p as new secret value for IDi and adds
(IDi,Yi1, ∗, xi, di, hi) to the list L. If IDi is not in the list,
it calls Create-User to create the new user IDi and adds xi to
the list L. If IDi = ID∗, C is unable to provide xi and aborts.
Set-Public-Key : AII sends qsp queries on a selected IDi
to C. For IDi 6= ID∗, C returns Yi = (Yi1,Yi2) if IDi is in L,
where
Yi1 = gi, Yi2 = gxi ,
and update L = (IDi,Yi1,Yi2, xi, di, hi). Otherwise, if IDi =
ID∗, C returns:
Y∗1 = g∗, Y∗2 = gx ,
where gx is given in the q-BSDH instance, and updates the
list L = (IDi, g∗, gx , ∗, di, hi).
Sign-Queries : AdversaryAII makes qs signature queries
for (IDi,mj) to C. If IDi 6= ID∗ and xi is in the list L, C selects








where tj = H (rj,Yi2,mj). C outputs the signature σ = (rj, Sij)
and sends it to AII.
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If IDi = ID∗ and mj 6= m∗, where xi = ∗, C performs the
following:
Let f be the univariate polynomial defined as




Expand f and write




where α0, · · · , αq ∈ Zp are the coefficients of the poly-




Let fj be the polynomial




Weexpand fj and rewrite f (X ) =
∑q
i=0 αiX











where C has rewritten x as t ·x. Returns σ = (r, Sij) as a valid
signature on mj.
We can easily find that σ is a valid signature on message
mj under the public key Y∗1 = g∗,Y∗2 = gx .AII can continue
signature queries before returning the forged signature.
Forgery : Finally, AII outputs a forged signature σ ∗ =
(r∗, S∗) for a message m∗ 6∈ {m1, · · · ,mq} where ID∗ 6= IDi




where d∗ is the partial private key for ID∗ and is
held by AII. The forgery is successful if CLS-Verify









































where x ′ = t∗ · x.
C uses the long division to compute f (x)/(x + r∗) and
computes polynomial f (X ) as
f (X ) = (X + r∗)γ (X )+ γ ∗




and γ ∗ ∈ Zp is a constant. Then, it computes f (X ) as follows:







and can deduce S∗ from equation (2) as









where γ ∗ 6= 0. Notice that since f (X ) =
∏q
i=1(X + ri) and
m∗ /∈ {m1, · · · ,mq}, f (X ) cannot be divided by (X + r∗) and
therefore C outputs the solution e(g, g)
1




































x+r∗/t∗ = e(g, g)
1
x+c .






where c = r∗/t∗, and it
then breaks the q-BSDH assumption.
In the following, we perform a probability analysis. For a
successful forgery, we consider three events:
01: C does not abort during the simulation.
02: S∗ is a valid forged signature on m∗ for ID∗.
03: The advantage of AII to forge a signature.












where 1/p is the probability AII asked the secret value x for
user ID∗.






























For Forgery, AII outputs a forged signature. If the verifi-
cation outputs Valid, then the game ends; otherwise C aborts.
The probability C does not abort is Pr[02] = 1/p.
Assume the advantage that AII forges a signature suc-
cessfully is Pr[03] ≥ ε. The overall success probability of
breaking q-BSDH assumption is:
Pr[01 ∧ 02 ∧ 03] = Pr[01] · Pr[02] · Pr[03].
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TABLE 1. Computation costs comparisons.
The advantage of AII breaking the q-BSDH assumption is:










We now compute the time complexity of the game. Let T
be the time cost for computing an exponentiation.
For Set-Public-Key, C requires qspT .
For SignQueries, C requires (qs + q)T .
The total time cost is the sum of these time costs:
qspT + (qs + q)T ≈ 2(qs + q)T .
The overall time for AII to break the q-BSDH assumption is
considered as
t ′ ≥ t +2(qs + q)T .
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Here, we evaluate the efficiency of our CLS scheme
and also compare it with the CLS schemes proposed by
Karati et al. [9], Zhang et al. [20], Huang et al. [15],
Choi et al. [17], He et al. [21], Tsai [22], and Yuan and
Wang [23], in terms of computation time, security type
and complexity assumption. We also present details about
the experiment, efficiency and signature length of our CLS
scheme.
A. RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT
To evaluate the efficiency of our CLS scheme, we preformed
implementations with language C coding on a personal com-
puter, Dell Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-8500CPU@3.90-GHz pro-
cessor, 16 GB RAM, Ubuntu 16.4 LTS, using GNU Multiple
Precision Arithmetic (GMP) library and Pairing Based Cryp-
tography (PBC) library. In Table 1, we show computation
costs of our CLS scheme and the other CLS schemes.
In Table 1, the computation costs are measured according
to the pre-computation costs of operations over bilinear pair-
ings in PBC library. We selected Type-A pairings with 512-b
group and embedding degree 2 equals to the 1024-b RSA
security level. Type-A pairing is constructed on the super
singular elliptic curve y2 = x3 + x over the field Fq where
|G| = |GT | = |Z∗p| are prime ordered groups of points E(Fq).
In the next sub-section, we discuss computational time and
signature length of our proposed CLS scheme in detail.
FIGURE 2. Cost comparisons of our scheme and other CLS schemes.
B. COMPUTATIONAL TIME
In Table 1, the time cost of signature generation and signature
verification are shown according to the time cost of crypto-
graphic primitive operations.
In our CLS scheme, the time cost of Setup algorithm
consists of generating a pair of prime ordered group (G,GT )
and one exponentiation. The cost ofSet-Partial-Private-Key
algorithm and Set-Public-Key algorithm is one exponentia-
tion each. In addition, the signer requires to spend one expo-
nentiation for running CLS-Sign algorithm. The CLS-Verify
algorithm requires two exponentiations and one pairing com-
putation in order that the verifier can check the validity of a
signature.
The total computation cost of our proposed CLS scheme
equals to 5.45ms (Table 1), which consists of computation
costs of running Setup algorithm, Set-Partial-Private-Key
algorithm and partial-private-key verification, Set-Secret-
Value algorithm, Set-Public-Key algorithm, CLS-Sign
algorithm and CLS-Verify algorithm.
As it is presented in Figure 2, the computation time of our
CLS scheme is the lowest among other schemes presented
in Table 1. The unit of y-axis in this figure is milliseconds
(ms). Our scheme offers a very short signature size as it is
shown in Table 1 and therefore is the most efficient one.
C. SIGNATURE LENGTH
TheCLS-Sign algorithm in our proposed CLS scheme is two
elements: r ∈ Zp and S ∈ G, which is shorter than that of the
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proposed CLS scheme by Karati et al. [9]. The CLS-Sign
algorithm in [9] generates two tuples and the length of signa-
ture is 2|Gq|. In addition, the length of signature algorithms
in Scheme 1 proposed by Huang et al. [15], the CLS scheme
proposed by Choi et al. [17], He et al. [21] and Tsai [22] are
|Gq|, which are also short and efficient. However, the Sign
algorithm in the proposed CLS scheme in [20] and [23]
are two tuples and three tuples respectively, which are less
efficient than our CLS scheme.
IX. CONCLUSION
The emerging Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) can amelio-
rate productivity, flexibility and save costs in different areas
of industry, however it can poses new data security issues,
particularly authentication. In this paper, we analysed the
security of the certificateless signature scheme (CLS) for IIoT
proposed in [9]. We showed that the scheme is universally
forgeable under chosen message attacks. This can make the
scheme insecure under their defined adversarial models of
Type-I and Type-II. We proposed an entirely new scheme that
resists Type-I and Type-II adversaries. Our CLS scheme is
the first lightweight scheme that can be proved with a very
tight security reduction and is computationally efficient in
comparison with other existing schemes. In order to show
the computational efficiency of our proposed CLS scheme,
we simulated our scheme and measured the time complexity.
As a result, our CLS scheme is more secure and lightweight
than other existing schemes and therefore more suitable for
IIoT applications.
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